The Bhutan We Think We Know

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Analysis

Bhutan's Teacher Exodus: The Classroom That Emptied Twice

In 2023 Bhutan gave its civil servants, teachers among them, the largest pay rise since pay commissions began. Then 1,193 teachers left the schools in a single year, the most in at least five years. At the same time the children stopped arriving: births down a quarter in three years, 42 schools closed. The classroom is emptying from both ends at once — and the steeper half of the fall hasn't happened yet.

1 September 2026 · 8 min read

On this page · 5 sections
  1. The first emptying: the teachers
  2. The second emptying: the children
  3. The compounding, visible in one exam
  4. The part that hasn’t happened yet
  5. What this actually is

In 2023 Bhutan did something unusually decisive. The civil-service pay revision raised pay by 55 to 74 percent across the grades, about 60 percent for a teacher in the professional grades — the largest revision since pay commissions began in 2008 — on top of the teaching allowance of 35 to 55% of minimum pay that teachers have had since 2019. It was an expensive answer to a problem everyone could see: civil servants, teachers prominent among them, were leaving for Australia.

The following year, 1,193 teachers left the school system, the most in at least five years: about ninety-nine a month. Some 750 of them left by choice.

That sequence matters, because it complicates the comfortable explanation. Across the civil service as a whole, departures fell after the raise. Among teachers they rose. Pay alone has not been enough to hold them, even after the largest revision in fifteen years.

The first emptying: the teachers

The attrition curve does not drift upward. It jumps.

2020202120222023202402004006008001,0001,2001,400Teachers leaving1633534783711,193July 2023: pay revision of 55–74%753 by choiceAll departuresLeft by choiceContract endedMoved to a regular postOtherThe year the most teachers leftTeachers leaving Bhutan's public schools each year. The 2023 civil-service revision raised pay by 55–74% across the grades. In 2024, 1,193 teachers left,the most in at least five years: about 750 by choice, 318 at the end of a contract, and 107 moving from contract to regular posts. Source: MoESD / Kuensel.
2020202120222023202402004006008001,0001,2001,400Teachers leaving1633534783711,193July 2023: pay revision of 55–74%753All departuresLeft by choiceContract endedMoved to a regular postOtherThe year the most teachers left

Departures ran 163 in 2020, then 353, then 478, then 371 — and then 1,193 in 2024.

The 2024 figure needs unpacking, because not all of it is resignation. Of the 1,193, 648 were contract teachers and 545 regular. About 750 left by choice: 529 regular teachers who left without early retirement, and 224 other voluntary resignations. Another 318 reached the end of their contracts. And 107 were contract teachers whose contracts ended because they moved into regular posts, so they never left the classroom. Even on the narrowest count, voluntary departures were twice the total for the year before. Most who left were early in their careers: 728 had served four years or less, 583 of them on contract.

Across 2020–2025 the education ministry’s own arithmetic is what matters: 5,516 teachers resigned; 3,619 were recruited. A shortfall of 1,897. The teaching force stood at 9,484 in mid-2025.

The losses are not evenly spread, which is what turns a staffing number into a classroom problem. Attrition ran worst in higher secondary schools, around 12.5%, and among women teaching at that level, near 15.8%. Those are the subject specialists and the senior classes. A national pupil-teacher ratio of 15:1 looks comfortable on paper and conceals a physics teacher covering thirty-plus periods a week, multigrade classes in the east, and remote-teaching pilots standing in for people.

The state has not been passive: 86 STEM teachers recruited, 214 postgraduate-diploma deployments scheduled for July 2026, a nationwide redeployment to even out staffing, and the phasing out of the contract-teacher system, which the ministry says has left gaps where replacements have not yet arrived. Part of the 2024 jump reflects that change in how teachers are employed. But the 2023 pay rise is still instructive. If a raise of that size is followed by more teachers choosing to go, the comparison being made is not only Bhutanese-salary-then against Bhutanese-salary-now. It is also what a salary buys, and in which currency — a comparison Thimphu does not control.

The second emptying: the children

While the staff were leaving the building, the intake was thinning.

Registered births fell from 10,755 in 2021 to 8,182 in 2024 — roughly a quarter, in three years. Total school enrolment is down about 13% from its 2012 peak to 156,272. Forty-two schools have closed since 2020, mostly small rural primaries dropping below viable size, and the system now carries something like 30,000 empty public-school seats. The 13th Plan proposes consolidating 505 schools into 319.

The geography of the loss matters as much as the size. The contraction is rural; the congestion is urban. Thimphu’s enrolment went from 26,103 to 29,895 in a single year while village schools closed. The same movement that empties a Trashigang classroom overfills a Thimphu one — internal migration and emigration are the same impulse at different distances.

And the two emptyings share a cause. The cohort that emigrates is aged roughly 25 to 40. That is the teaching cohort. It is also the cohort that has children. Remove it and a school loses its staff and its future pupils in the same decade, for the same reason.

The compounding, visible in one exam

For fifteen years, Bhutan’s Class XII pass rate sat between 85% and 91%, peaking at 91.55% in 2019. Then it broke to 77.84% in 2025 — the worst in twelve years.

The rate alone understates it, because the cohort was shrinking at the same time, and the two multiply. The number of students who actually passed Class XII went from 11,234 in 2021 to 7,218 in 2025 — down 36% in four years.

That last figure deserves to be read slowly, because it is not an education statistic. It is the annual supply of qualified eighteen-year-olds to everything downstream: the university, the civil-service exam, the hospitals, the banks, the army, the private sector — and Australia. Every institution in Bhutan that recruits young adults is drawing from a pool that has shrunk by more than a third in four years, and most of them have not yet noticed, because their own intakes lag.

The part that hasn’t happened yet

Here is the finding that should shape planning, and it cuts against the panic as much as it feeds it.

The bottom of the funnel has not collapsed yet. Pre-primary intake peaked around 17,300 in 2009–10 and now runs about 11,200–11,900. That is a serious decline, but it is not the birth collapse — because today’s five-year-olds were born around 2018–19, when births were still near 10–11,000.

The 8,182 children born in 2024 reach pre-primary around 2029–30. That is when intake falls toward eight thousand and the closure of forty-two schools starts to look like a first instalment.

Which means the education system is currently absorbing the teacher half of the shock while the pupil half is still in transit — arriving on a schedule already fixed by births that have already happened. Nothing decided in 2026 can change the size of the 2030 intake. It can only change how ready the system is when it arrives.

What this actually is

It is tempting to file all of this under “brain drain” and move on. That framing is too small.

A brain drain is a loss of talent. What Bhutan is running is closer to a structural resizing — a country whose institutions were built for a population shape that is being replaced by a different one, faster than the institutions can be redesigned. The schools were built for 176,000 pupils and hold 156,000. The teacher corps was sized for a system that is shrinking at one end and haemorrhaging at the other. The exam system is certifying a third fewer graduates than it did four years ago.

The two emptyings call for responses on different clocks. The government’s Third Child Plus Programme, with its incentives for larger families, works on the long one: a child born in 2027 joins the workforce around 2050. The teacher shortfall of 1,897, the 42 schools already closed and this year’s pass rate sit on the short one, and they are being met by other measures: recruitment, redeployment and the consolidation of small schools set out in the 13th Plan.

Taken together, the numbers suggest the classroom of the next twenty years may be smaller and more consolidated, and better staffed per pupil, in a system sized for the country it serves. Planning for that is as much a part of the answer as reversing it.

The bell still rings at the same hour in every school in the country. In forty-two of them, since 2020, it has stopped ringing altogether.

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